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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case # 20000255-CA
Priority # 2

v.
DAN APPIS,
Defendant/Appellant

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT FULLY CONSIDER CIRCUMSTANCES
CONCERNING THE PRESENTATION OF INFORMATION CONCERNING SUCH
CIRCUMSTANCES.
The trial court's reasoning in sentencing Mr. Appis to
prison was stated as follows:
I'm impressed with the [Diagnostic
Evaluation] report, that it's covered all
of the necessary issues and that it's
accurate- And that where the defendant
takes issue with the report, that his
position is incorrect. And . . . it's
really a very thorough, well thought out
and articulated report. I'm going to
follow the recommendations.
(Tr. at p. 11, see Addendum V, Brief of
Appellant)
This statement provides the entire basis for this

court's determination of whether or not Mr. Appisf
aggravating and mitigating circumstances were fully
considered as required by statute.

Yet the trial court's

statement contains no reference to even one specific
circumstance addressed by Mr. Appis, nor to any specific
issues within the report (as conceded by the State in its
responsive brief (Brief of Appellant, p. 11), the trial judge
did not even mention the psychological evaluation conducted
by a Department of Corrections licensed psychologist, which
recommended inpatient treatment for Mr. Appis (Addendum IV,
Brief of Appellant, p. 6; see
12, 16-18).

Brief of Appellant at pp. 11-

Thus, it is difficult to conclude that Mr.

Appis1 circumstances were fully considered (See

Brief of

Appellant at pp. 4-12)
The State, in its Appellee Brief, makes numerous
references to information in the record which allegedly
supports the trial court's sentence (Brief of Appellee at pp.
5-7, 10-12, 14-15); however, none of this information was
mentioned by the court itself.

The State prefaces such

information with phrases such as "factors...presented to the
sentencing court..." (Id. at p. 5 ) , "the evidence before the

-2-

court..." (Id. at p. 12), "perhaps the trial judge
recognized,.." (Id. at p. 11) and "[t]he trial judge's
remarks...implied his familiarity..." (Id. at p. 11).
However, the mere fact that the court had access to certain
information does not, in itself, show that such information
was fully considered as required by Section 76-3-201(6)(e).
In State v. Strunk:, 846 P. 2d 1297 (Utah 1993), the Utah
Supreme Court specifically declined to make such an inference
from the mere possession of information by the trial court.
In that case, the mitigating factor of the defendant's youth
not only had been presented to the trial court in various
documentation, but also was visually apparent at trial.

Yet

the reviewing court refused to assume that this circumstance
had been given full consideration, stating, "being aware of
his age and taking it into account are not the same thing."
In the absence of any mention by the trial court of this
mitigating circumstance, the Supreme Court was unable to
confirm that the sentencing had been "conducted with full
information and with careful deliberation of all relevant
factors," as required by the statute. (Id. at 1300;
Appellee's Brief pp. 8-12).
-3-

In State v. Beltran-Felix, 922 P.2d 30, 37 (Utah App.
1996), a case based upon the present statute, the State
similarly argued that "[a] finding may be implied if it is
clear from the record, and therefore apparent upon review,
that the finding was actually made as part of the tribunal's
decision," (quoting
(Utah App. : 1991).

Adams b. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1, 5
The Utah Court of Appeals rejected this

view and held that the trial court's failure to enter
findings constituted plain error.
P.2d 937, 940 (Utah 1996).

See State v. Labrum, 925

That court reached a similar

result in State v. Ramirez, 924 P.2d 365, 371 (1996), noting
that "findings of fact may not be inferred, but must clearly
be made part of the record at sentencing . . . .[W]e will not
merely imply what testimony might have persuaded the trial
court . . . ."

See also

State v. Anderson, 979 P.2d 1114,

1117 (Utah App. 1990)(holding judgment must be clear, written
and definite).
Similarly, in the present case, the fact that the trial
judge had information available to him concerning aggravating
and mitigating factors does not establish that such factors
were fully and carefully considered.
-4-

As noted above, the

trial court did not even mention the psychological evaluation
conducted by a licensed psychologist for the Utah Department
of Corrections, which recommended inpatient treatment for Mr.
Appis1 "Borderline Personality Disorder" and substance abuse
(Addendum IV, Brief of Appellant at p. 6)

Nor did the court

discuss Mr. Appis1 "moderate and nonviolent criminal record"
(Diagnostic Evaluation Report,' Addendum III, Brief of
Appellant at p. 8; see

"Adult Record," Presentence

Investigation Report, Addendum II, Brief of Appellant at p.
4) nor his low score on the Criminal History Assessment
attached to his Presentence Investigation Report ("Form
l:Criminal History Assessment," Id. at p. 11), which placed
him under the "Regular probation" category of the
accompanying grid.
In rejecting the above-recommended option of inpatient
substance abuse treatment for Mr. Appis the court did not
address Mr. Appis1 observation that his previous attempts at
rehabilitation had been limited by the lack of individual
counseling which might have increased their efficacy (Id. at
p. 7; see

Brief of Appellant, pp. 17-18).

Nor did the court

discuss the widespread unavailability of substance abuse
-5-

treatment program in the prison context. (See Brief of
Appellant at pp. 14-15)

In order to comply with Section 76—

3-201(6)(e), the court should have given full consideration
to such factors; yet no such consideration is shown by the
record.

As noted, the omission constituted an abuse of

discretion on the part of the court.
II. UTAH" CODE ANN. §76-3-201(6) (d) SHOULD GOVERN
APPELLANT'S CASE AND THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION BY FAILING TO COMPLY THEREWITH,
UTAH CODE ANN.

§76-3-201(6) (D) states that, "[t]he court

shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term."

The State

asserts in its Appellee's Brief that the above section
applied only to cases involving mandatory sentencing statutes
and thus did not require compliance by the trial judge in the
present case (Appellee's Brief at pp. 16-18).
Although UTAH CODE ANN. §76-3-201(6) (A) refers to sentences
based upon mandatory sentencing statutes, §76-3-201(6)(D) and
other subsections need not be limited to the mandatory
sentencing context (Appellant's Brief, Addendum IV at p. 5 ) .
Rather, the individual subsections of §76-3-201(6 ) address
various circumstances which may affect the length of a

-6-

sentence, only the first of which involves mandatory
sentencing.

For example, subsections (b) and (e) both

discuss procedures relating to aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, which may be considered in indeterminate
sentencing as well as minimum sentencing.
Although most of the cases interpreting the above
statute have involved minimum mandatory sentencing, neither
the title of this subsection, its structure, nor its express
terms limit its application solely to the mandatory
sentencing context.1
The Utah Supreme Court discussed the objectives of the
foregoing statute in State v. Bell, 754 P.2d 55, 59 (Utah
1988):
With the requirements that the trial judge
set forth on the record those facts and
reasons which are mitigating or
aggravating in nature and the reason for
his choice of the particular sentence
imposed, the statute provides an adequate
basis both for guiding the trial court's
discretion and for this Court to review
the trial court's exercise of that
discretion.

*The statutory history of this section, as shown by annotations to the Utah Code, reveals that
the provision in question was originally found in an earlier subsection which contained no
reference to mandatory sentencing, yet required that the court make the reasons for its decision a
part of the court record (See LdL "Notes, References and Annotations Amendment Notes.")
-7-

Both of the statutory purposes elucidated by the Bell
court are served by the application of Utah Code Ann. §7 6-3201(6) (D) to indeterminate sentencing as well as minimum
mandatory sentencing.

By requiring a court record of the

circumstances and considerations resulting in a particular
sentence, the statute increases the care given to sentencing
decisions and also ensures a proper -review of such decisions
where appropriate.

As discussed in Section I above, it is

difficult to confirm the court's full information and careful
deliberation "of all relevant factors" in the absence of any
mention of such factors by the court.

See also

State v.

Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 940 (Utah 1996); State v. Nelson, 725
P.2d 1353, 1355-6 n.3 (Utah 1986)(holding written findings
necessary in order for court to properly perform its
appellate review function).
Even in the absence of an explicit statutory
requirement, the Utah Supreme Court has required lower
courts, in certain contexts, to support orders of particular
importance with a statement of supporting facts and reasons.
For example, in State v. Clatterbuck, 700 P.2d 1076,
1080-1 (Utah 1985), the court imposed such a requirement in

-8-

connection with the process of juvenile certification for
trial pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

§78-3A-25 (2)

. Although the

latter statute contains no explicit requirement of a
statement of findings by the court, it does specify, like §763-201(6)(E), that the court "shall consider" certain factors
in reaching its decision.

Because of this language, the

court reasoned that a statement of reasons was necessary in
order to ensure' that the statutory requirements had been
met.2 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
In State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353, 1355-6 n.3 (Utah
1985), the Utah Supreme Court held written findings to be
necessary prior to admission of out-of-court statements of
child abuse victims, again in the absence of an explicit
statutory requirement.

The Court reasoned that, "Only when

these steps are taken can a defendant be assured that the

2

The court instructed that such orders must contain the following:
a sufficiently detailed statement of facts to permit us to
determine that a full investigation has been made and that each of
the statutory factors has been considered. In addition, we hold that
the juvenile court must specify which statutory factors it has relied
upon in deciding to certify, and it must explain why it thought
those factors provided sufficient reason to justify certification.

14 at p. 1081
Applying these criteria, the Clatterbuck court found that the order under its review
"rather than reflecting a thorough consideration of the facts in light of all the statutory factors,
merely recite[s] reasons or conclusions framed in terms of some, but not all, of these factors."

id*
-9-

statutorily required appraisal has been made.

Further, only

when such steps are taken can this Court properly perform its
appellate review function."

Accord

State v. Eldredge, 773

P.2d 29, 35-6 n.12 (Utah), cert, denied

493 U.S. 814 (1989);

State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048 (Utah 1991); State v. Cook,
881 P.2d 913, 915-6 (Utah App. 1994), cert,

denied,

890 P.2d

1034 (Utah 1995).
The State has advanced no policy reasons why the
requirement of a statement of reasons should apply only to
minimum mandatory sentencing.

Although a sentencing court

must exercise discretion in making a choice among mandatory
sentences, similar discretion is required in choosing between
an indeterminate prison term and parole with inpatient
treatment, as in the present case.

Nor is there more at

stake for the defendant in the pronouncement of a minimum
mandatory sentence, since either sentencing context
potentially involves the loss of liberty for some period.

In

State v. Egbert, 748 P.2d 558, 560 (Utah 1987), Chief Justice
Hall noted as follows:
The decision the statute required the
trial court to make in imposing one of
three alternative mandatory sentences did
not differ from other decisions made daily
on whether to impose indeterminate
sentences, to suspend sentences, or to
-10-

place offenders on probation.
Thus, as in Clatterbuck, due process requires that the
court specify reasons for imposing an indeterminate sentence,
including supporting facts and circumstances considered, even
if §76-3-201(6)(D) is construed to apply only to minimum
mandatory sentences.

The]mere fact that the trial court possessed information
concerning circumstances in aggravation and in mitigation of Mr.
Appis' sentence does not establish that the court gave proper
consideration to such circumstances, as required by §76-3201(6) (E).

In order to demonstrate the careful consideration

of all relevant factors and in keeping with §76-3-201(6) (D) ,
the court should have set forth supporting facts and reasons
for its sentencing decision.

Appellant respectfully submits

that the court's failure to do so constituted abuse of
discretion.
DATED THIS 26th day of October, 2000.

Happy J. Morgan
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
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